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Abstract
We consider risk-aware forest owners and electricity producers evaluating the Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)-based offsets with a benefit-
sharing mechanisms under uncertain CO2 prices. For a range of CO2 prices and respective
risks perceived by the forest owner (seller) and electricity producer (buyer), we apply a
model of fair (indifference) pricing. Parties’ risk preferences are reflected by exponential
utility functions. The potentially contracted amounts of REDD offsets are analyzed under
various risk preferences and for different benefit sharing opportunities. Our results show
that a risk-averse attitude considerably increases the contracted amounts of REDD offsets
(compared to risk-neutral case) and, therefore, creates a higher potential for REDD im-
plementation. We demonstrate possible situations, when parties could agree on a certain
range of REDD contracts, e.g. smaller amounts of REDD offsets are traded for higher
prices, and larger amounts – for lower prices, although contracting a moderate amount
at a moderate price is impossible. The suggested benefit sharing mechanism can help
increase contracted offset amounts. Our modeling results highlight two ways to promote
higher REDD participation: (i) increasing risk aversion of the energy producers, and (ii)
implementing the mechanism of benefit/risk sharing between the REDD consumer and
supplier.
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1 Introduction
This paper elaborates on the development of financial instruments that support Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) [1, 2, 3]. In the papers [4, 5]
decision-making of the price-taking electricity producers consists of choosing between in-
vesting in research and development (R&D) to implement new technologies (carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS) modules) and buying REDD options. We explore a similar idea of
employing REDD for offsetting emissions of electricity producers by setting a new problem
with a few distinctive features. Firstly, we consider the case when an energy producer has
a market power – the ability to reduce production output and charge higher electricity
prices to consumers. Thus, in the face of uncertain CO2 prices the electricity producer
with market power has more flexibility compared to the price-taking energy producer.
Secondly, the electricity producer in our model is a medium-term decision maker: he does
not change his technology portfolio by decommissioning CO2-intensive plants and building
new power plants (which would be a long-term investment). The optimization model works
with two time steps: initial (low) CO2 price and future (uncertain) CO2 price. This sim-
plified rather conceptual modeling approach is justified, because a dynamic model would
require additional information about the future which is not available at the moment:
CO2 price formation process, REDD offsets acceptance on the market, etc. For the same
reason we focus on the direct contracting of REDD offsets between the forest owner and
electricity producer, and do not consider market modeling.
We construct a microeconomic model of interaction between the forest owner (REDD
supplier), electricity producer (REDD offsets consumer), and electricity consumer. In the
proposed partial equilibrium modeling framework CO2 prices are exogenous and uncertain.
The decision-making process of the electricity producer (under a condition of an existing
or absent CO2 tax/price) consists of (see, e.g., [6, 7]): (i) choosing power plant load factors
to minimize the cost given the hourly electricity demand profile and installed capacities of
particular power generation technologies; and (ii) choosing an electricity price to maximize
the profit based on the demand function indicating consumers’ sensitivity to electricity
prices.
The electricity producer in the model has market power meaning that he has the
possibility of setting a price for electricity above his marginal cost according to a demand
function. Recent studies suggest that energy companies possess a certain degree of market
*Ecosystems Services & Management Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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power [6, 8, 9]. We apply a constant elasticity demand function [10] in the model. The
elevating CO2 price might impact not only the profits of the electricity producer (decrease),
but also the electricity prices for the consumer (increase), and, hence, some financial
instruments might be implemented today in order to be prepared for the uncertain CO2
prices in the future [3]. We propose and explore financial instruments supporting the
REDD program. On the supply side of the REDD-based emission offsets we model a
forest owner who decided to preserve the forest and sell respectively generated REDD-
based emission offsets (further – REDD offsets). The focus of our analysis is on how the
forest owner and the electricity producer evaluate their fair prices for different amounts of
REDD offsets. In the paper the fairness of the price is understood in the sense of parties’
indifference of whether to engage in contracting a given amount of REDD offsets or not.
The fair price of the electricity producer (forest owner) means that for a higher (lower)
price the electricity producer (forest owner) will not want to engage in the contract. In
case the parties can agree on a fair price, the problem is to find a range of REDD offsets’
amounts which can be contracted.
Risk preferences play an important role in the model of fair pricing. Here we employ
exponential utility functions to reflect parties’ risk attitudes. The exponential utility
admits all types of risk preferences : risk-taking, risk-neutral, and risk-averse.
The idea of benefit sharing is important within the REDD context [11]. We propose
a benefit sharing mechanism that is activated in the case when electricity producer emits
less than the amount of REDD offsets contracted in the first period (without CO2 price);
in this case the unused amount of REDD offsets is shared with the forest owner.
The paper considers mathematical constructions and properties of a proposed financial
instrument. Analytical results presented in the paper are illustrated by a numerical case
study based on realistic data for regional electricity production. Modeling results show
how risk preferences of the electricity producer and forest owner, combined with the benefit
sharing mechanism, impact the fair prices and contracted amounts of REDD offsets. Our
key findings signal that higher REDD participation can be achieved through increasing
the parties’ risk aversion and activating the benefit sharing mechanism.
2 Modeling Framework
In this section, firstly, we present a model of an electricity producer with market power
operating without contracting REDD offsets. The decision-making of the electricity pro-
ducer consists in choosing a technological mix in order to meet the hourly demand and to
maximize profit. The optimal response in terms of emissions’ reduction and raising elec-
tricity prices is constructed for any future CO2 price. Secondly, we introduce a two-period
model for REDD offsets contracting. Given the distribution of uncertain CO2 prices in
the second period, the electricity producer solves in the first period the problem of ex-
pected profit maximization for various amounts of contracted REDD offsets. In general,
the electricity producer maximizes utility – a function of his profits. In our study we apply
the exponential utility function, that fits well with our modeling framework. In the first
time period, based on the comparison of maximum expected utilities with and without
contracting REDD offsets, the electricity producer evaluates his fair (indifference) price
for each amount of offsets that they could potentially buy. Similarly, the forest owner
– the seller of REDD offsets – calculates his fair price, based on the exponential utility
reflecting his risk preferences. We also introduce the benefit sharing mechanism and solve
the optimization problem of the electricity producer, who has two options: either (i) to
emit more than available REDD offsets purchasing the CO2 offsets on the market to cover
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excess of their emissions, or (ii) to emit less and share the benefits from selling the excess
of offsets at a market price with the forest owner.
2.1 Notations
In our model the electricity producer uses n technologies varying in costs (US$/MWh,
excluding emission costs) and emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh). Let us introduce the
following notations:
ai, i = 1, .., n are installed capacities (MW);
vi are variable costs (US$/MWh);
dj , j = 1, .., 24 is hourly average demand (MW);
x = {xij}, i =, 1.., n, j = 1, .., 24, is a matrix of hourly load factors (controls, ratio
between 0 and 1);
q(x) = (q1, ., q24) = {
∑n
i=1 aixij} is a vector of hourly outputs (MW);
Q = Q(x) =
∑n
i=1 ai
∑24
j=1 xij is aggregate daily production (MWh);
P e is electricity price (US$/MWh);
D−1 : P e = D−1(Q) is inverse demand function (see Section 3.1);
εi are emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh);
p is CO2 price (US$/ton of CO2).
2.2 Model description
For each matrix of load factors x the profit of the electricity producer in the absence of
CO2 price is calculated as follows:
Πe(x) = R(x)− C(x), (1)
where
R(x) = P e
(
Q(x)
)
Q(x), (2)
is the revenue, and
C(x) =
N∑
i=1
viai
24∑
j=1
xij + Fc, (3)
is the cost function. A constant fixed cost component, Fc, is not included in the optimiza-
tion problem, and is used only for profit calculation.
For each CO2 price p a production scenario x generates corresponding emissions:
E(x) =
n∑
i=1
εiai
24∑
j=1
xij , (4)
and the total profit of the electricity producer is calculated as follows:
Π(x, p) = Πe(x)− E(x)p. (5)
We will assume that the CO2 price belongs to a segment p ∈ [0, p˜]. Let us note that
profit component Πe and emissions E do not directly depend on price p, however, they
are indirectly determined by the technological possibilities of the electricity producer.
We assume that hourly profile changes proportionally to the aggregate demand (see
[3] and section 3.1 for details) and introduce the feasibility domain X, which contains all
technological mixes (controls) satisfying the hourly demand:
X = {x : xij ∈ [0, 1] and q(x) ≥
Q(x)
Q0
d0}, (6)
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where d0 = (d01, .., d
0
24) and Q
0 are, respectively, the initial hourly and daily aggregate
demands (at zero CO2 price).
For convenience, let us first consider the electricity producer as a profit maximizing
decision maker, and afterwards introduce his utility (as a function of profit). The profit
maximization problem is formulated as follows.
Problem 1 (without REDD offsets). Given the feasibility domain X (6), for every CO2
price p the electricity producer maximizes his profit (5):
maximize
x∈X
Π(x, p). (7)
Let us denote a solution to the Problem 1 – the optimal technological mix – by the
symbol x∗
1
= x∗
1
(p) for any price p ∈ [0, p˜]. Then, by definition of x∗
1
for any x ∈ X (6)
the following inequality holds:
Π(x∗
1
, p) ≥ Π(x, p). (8)
Let us denote by the symbol Πˆ(p) the maximum profit at price p:
Πˆ(p) = Π(x∗
1
(p), p) = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p. (9)
The corresponding electricity price is calculated as P e(Q(x∗
1
(p)).
2.3 Assumptions for modeling
In our study we assume the following properties of optimal profit Πˆ(p) (9) and emissions
Eˆ(p) = E(x∗
1
(p), p) with respect to CO2 price.
Assumption 1. The optimal profit and optimal emissions achieve their maxima at zero
CO2 price, p = 0, and are continuous strictly declining functions with respect to growing
p:
Πˆ(p) ↓, Eˆ(p) ↓, when p ↑ . (10)
This assumption is straightforward in the provided modeling framework as the power
generation technologies are fixed (see also [3]). It is consistent with the results of larger
scale modeling [12] in the short and medium term.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 basically restricts the consideration of electricity producers to
those unfavorably (negatively) affected by an emerging CO2 price. Those who can poten-
tially benefit from it, e.g. due to a competitive advantage, are not considered here. This
situation is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the problem of CO2-intensive
power generation.
2.4 Modeling REDD-based offsets under uncertainty
High CO2 price decreases the profit of the electricity producer. This negative effect as such
can be amplified by uncertainty about the future CO2 price levels and lead to an excessive
risk. To hedge against that the emitter can engage in contracting REDD offsets before
the information about CO2 price is revealed, so that contracted REDD offsets could allow
offsetting CO2 emissions in the future. Let us note that we are not taking into account
additional factors in the payoff of a REDD supplier (forest owner), e.g. opportunity of
deforesting and selling the wood. We assume that the forest owner decided to keep the
forest for generating REDD offsets.
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Let the future CO2 price be an uncertain variable [13] following a discrete probability
distribution:
{pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m,
m∑
l=1
wl = 1, pl ∈ [0, p˜], wl ∈ (0, 1], (11)
where wl stands for probability, and realizations of possible prices are pi 6= pj , if i 6= j.
A problem is divided into two stages (time periods): in the first stage the forest owner
and electricity producer negotiate an amount E ∈ (0, E0] of REDD offsets and their price.
Here E0 is the maximum amount of emissions – generated by the electricity producer at
zero CO2 price, i.e. E
0 = Eˆ(0).
In the second stage they face the realization of uncertain CO2 prices. At each realiza-
tion of the CO2 price the electricity producer can either use all REDD offsets (by emitting
more or equal to the previously contracted amount E), or emit less than E and share the
benefit with the forest owner from selling the rest (unused offsets) on the market (at a
market price p).
Benefit sharing mechanism The electricity producer and forest owner, when selling
offsets on the market, get shares of the market price δ and (1− δ) respectively, so that:
• If δ = 1, the electricity producer has the right to sell the offsets in the second period
at a market price without sharing the profit with forest owner.
• If δ = 0, the electricity producer can only use the contracted REDD credits to offset
the factual amount of his emissions and the unused credits are returned (without
compensation) back to the forest owner, i.e. no resale by the electricity producer
is possible on the market. The profit from unused offsets goes entirely to the forest
owner.
• If 0 < δ < 1, the electricity producer faces a trade-off between emitting more and,
hence, using more of the contracted REDD credits for offsetting their emissions
versus sharing the profit with the forest owner from selling the offsets at the market
price.
The benefit sharing ratio δ is included in the negotiation process between REDD-
offsets supplier (forest owner) and consumer (electricity producer) along with the amount
of offsets E and their price.
We assume that the forest owner and electricity producer face the same CO2 price
distribution. The presence of REDD offsets at the second stage of the model leads to the
following modification of the Problem 1 (the case without REDD).
Problem 2 (with REDD offsets). Given the feasibility domain X (6), CO2 price distribu-
tion {pl, wl} (11), benefit sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1], and amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (0, E
0]
contracted in the first time period the electricity producer solves in the second time period
the following profit-maximization problem for every possible future CO2 price pl:
maximize
x∈X
ΠR(x, pl), (12)
where
ΠR(x, pl) = Πe(x)− pl
[
E(x)− E
]
+
+ δpl
[
E − E(x)
]
+
. (13)
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Here [y]+ = max{y, 0}, meaning that the electricity producer can offset his emissions
up to the amount E by using REDD offsets, the rest is sold on the market and the profit
is shared with the forest owner.
The optimal technological mix x∗
2
(pl) – solution to (12) – generates the maximum
profit with REDD:
ΠˆR(pl) = Π
R(x∗
2
(pl), pl), (14)
at a particular CO2 price pl. We denote by the symbol:
ER(pl) =
[
E − E(x∗
2
(pl))
]
+
, (15)
the corresponding amount of unused emission offsets that have to be sold on the market
generating the profit (to be shared).
2.5 Modeling risk preferences of forest owner and electricity producer
We model risk preferences by implementing utility functions. Let us denote by the symbol
UF the utility of the forest owner, and by the symbol UE – electricity producer’s utility.
In our model utilities are functions of profits:
UE = UE(ΠE), UF = UF (ΠF ). (16)
Here symbol ΠF stands for the profit of the forest owner from selling REDD offsets (to
be specified in more detail in section 2.5.2), and ΠE is the profit of electricity producer:
ΠE = Π as in (5) without REDD, and ΠE = ΠR (13) with REDD. In this paper we
deal with exponential utility functions. Thus, electricity producer’s utility is given by the
function:
UE(ΠE) = (1− e
−αΠE )/α, (17)
where α is a constant parameter that represents the degree of risk preference: α > 0 for
risk-aversion, and α < 0 for risk-taking. Applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule, one can show the
following asymptotic property:
lim
α→0
1− e−αΠE
α
= lim
α→0
ΠEe
−αΠE = ΠE , (18)
meaning that when α tends to zero the utility function (17) converges to the risk-neutral
utility UE(ΠE) = ΠE . Exponential utility implies constant absolute risk aversion equal to
α (see [14]).
2.5.1 Utility maximization by the electricity producer
After the introduction of utility function (17) into the model, the profit maximization
Problem 1 (without REDD) (7) and Problem 2 (with REDD) (12) can be substituted,
respectively, by the utility maximization problems:
maximize
x∈X
UE(Π(x, pl)), (19)
maximize
x∈X
UE(Π
R(x, pl)). (20)
Remark 2. In the case of exponential utility function UE (17) the solutions to utility
maximization problems (19) and (20) coincide with the solutions to the profit maximization
problems (7) and (12), respectively.
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The utility function UE (17) is a strictly increasing with respect to ΠE :
dUE
dΠE
=
αe−αΠE
α
= e−αΠE > 0. (21)
Let us consider the case without REDD: ΠE = Π (5). The monotonicity property (21) by
definition means that for all x ∈X, such that Π(x∗1, pl) ≥ Π(x, pl) (8), we have
UE(Π(x
∗
1, pl)) ≥ UE(Π(x, pl)), (22)
meaning that x∗1(pl) delivers the maximum UE(Πˆ(pl)) in (19). The same reasoning is valid
for the case with REDD, implying that x∗2(pl) is the solution to problem (20).
2.5.2 Utility of the forest owner
The profit at price pl of the forest owner who does not contract REDD offsets in the first
time period is calculated as follows:
ΠOF (pl) = plE , (23)
meaning that he keeps all the offsets in the first period and sells them in the second period
when the CO2 price reveals.
His profit when contracting REDD offsets in the first time period (under unknown
CO2 price) is given by the optimal behavior (including benefit sharing) of the electricity
producer (see Problem 2):
ΠRF (pl) = (1− δ)plE
R(pl) + pFE . (24)
Recall, that symbol ER(pl) = E
R(E , δ) (15) denotes emissions shared with the electricity
producer in the second period at realization of CO2 price pl.
The utility function of the forest owner is given by the similar to (17) equation:
UF (ΠF ) = (1− e
−βΠF )/β, (25)
where β is a constant representing the risk preferences. Here profit ΠF = Π
O
F (23) without
REDD in the first time period, and ΠF = Π
R
F (24) with contracting REDD offsets under
uncertainty.
2.5.3 Expected utilities
In order to determine fair prices we need to introduce expected utilities. Given the
distribution {pl, wl} (11) of CO2 price, they are calculated straightforward:
E[UE(ΠE)] =
m∑
l=1
UE(ΠE(pl))wl, E[UF (ΠF )] =
m∑
l=1
UF (ΠF (pl))wl. (26)
Remark 3. If we apply risk-neutral utilities (special cases of (17) when α → 0 and (25)
when β → 0):
UE(ΠE) = ΠE , UF (ΠF ) = ΠF , (27)
then we arrive at the expected mean values (EMV) [13] in (26).
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2.5.4 Interpretation of risk preferences
The interpretation of parameter α in (17) is the following. For illustration, let us consider
a situation when a decision-maker evaluates his participation in the lottery with two
outcomes: he can win 10 mln. with a probability of 0.5, or loose 10 mln. with the same
probability. If α ≃ 0, the decision-maker’s expected utility (26) is zero, meaning that he
is indifferent on whether to participate in this lottery, or not. The risk-taker ’s expected
utility (with α = −0.1) is 5.43, meaning that he is willing to participate in the lottery.
On the contrary, the risk-averse person (α = 0.1) has an expected utility equal to −5.43,
meaning that he prefers to avoid this venture. In a similar manner, the risk preference
parameters reflect parties’ perception of the uncertain CO2 price distribution in our model.
In Figure 1 we can see the impact of risk-preferences to the shape of an exponential
utility function. Here we depict the functions of profit UE(ΠE) (17), where profit ΠE
belongs to the segment from 0 to 4 mln. US$, determined by our case-study below.
Prot, mln. US$
Ut
ilit
y
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Risk−taking
Neutral
Risk−averse
Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis of utility function with respect to risk preferences α = −0.2
– risk-taking, α ≃ 0 – risk-neutral, α = 0.2 – risk-averse.
2.6 Fair prices in the model with exponential risk preferences
The discussion below is devoted to valuation of various amounts of REDD offsets con-
tracted in the first time period under unknown CO2 price assuming the given distribution
(11) and a fixed benefit sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1]. The forest owner and electricity producer
evaluate their fair (indifference) prices for the given amount of offsets. The electricity
producer derives the price he is willing to pay for the REDD offsets according to his
indifference condition based on (9) and (14):
E[UE(Πˆ(pl))] = E[UE
(
ΠˆR(pl)− pEE
)
]. (28)
Here pE is the desired fair price of the electricity producer. Let us note, that here we
deal with the maximized expected utilities of the electricity producer. The maximum of
the utility function’s argument and, hence, the maximum of the utility function itself is
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achieved at solutions x∗2(pl) as the term pEE is a constant and, hence, it is not included
in the optimization (see (12), (19)-(20), and Remark 2). The indifference condition (28)
means that electricity producer’s expected utility stays the same whether the electricity
producer participates in REDD, or not.
Substituting exponential utility (17) into equality (28), we simplify it to the following
equation with respect to unknown fair price pE :
pE =
1
αE
(
ln(
m∑
l=1
e−αΠˆ(pl)wl)− ln(
m∑
l=1
e−αΠˆ
R(pl)wl)
)
. (29)
The indifference condition for the forest owner means that he chooses his fair price pF
in such a way, that his expected utility stays the same no matter if he engages in REDD
in the first time period, or not. Hence, the equation takes the form:
E[UF (Π
O
F (pl))] = E[UF (Π
R
F (pl)]. (30)
Let us derive the forest owner’s fair price for REDD offsets by substituting (23)-(25)
to (30):
pF =
1
βE
(
ln(
m∑
l=1
e−β(1−δ)plE
R(pl)wl)− ln(
m∑
l=1
e−βplEwl)
)
. (31)
Thus, for the given CO2 price distribution {pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m (11), benefit sharing
ratio δ ∈ [0, 1] and amount of offsets E ∈ (0, E0] one derives the fair prices of the forest
owner pF (31) and the electricity producer pE (29). Using equations of the fair prices,
we can find the volumes of REDD offsets E , for which the deal takes place. Namely, the
amount E can be contracted only if pF (E) ≤ pE(E), meaning that the selling price pF is
not higher than the buying price pE . Functions pF = pF (E) and pE = pE(E) represent,
respectively, risk-adjusted supply and demand curves for REDD offsets.
Remark 4. The exponential utility function (17) considered in this study possesses the
feature of equal buying and selling price of an asset, discussed e.g. in [13].
If we consider an electricity producer having REDD offsets and wishing to sell them
at a fair price denoted by psE subject to indifference equation inverse to (28):
E[UF (Πˆ
R
E(pl))] = E[UF (ΠˆE(pl) + p
s
EE)], (32)
we determine that the fair selling price coincides with the fair buying price: psE = pE
(29). The same is valid for the forest owner. It is well known that some other types of
utilities do not possess this feature (see, e.g. [13], p. 90) 1.
2.7 Analytical solution for risk-neutral case
As discussed above the risk-neutral utility is a special case of exponential utility. In
the case of risk-neutral utilities (27) we analytically find solutions to utility maximizing
problems (19)-(20) of the electricity producer depending on the amount of REDD offsets
E ∈ (0, E0] and determine the corresponding fair prices of the forest owner and electricity
producer. This allows us to obtain an analytical estimate of the amount of REDD offsets,
that can be contracted.
1Let us note that H. Raiffa [13] treats these prices as the prices for which one is willing to buy or sell
his participation in the lottery. In our case ”no lottery” means that the forest owner (electricity producer)
does not participate in REDD.
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Theorem 1 (Risk-neutral case). In the case, when both forest owner and electricity pro-
ducer are risk-neutral, meaning that their expected utilities are mean values (27), for a
given CO2 price distribution {pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m (11) and for any benefit sharing ratio
δ ∈ [0, 1) there exists an amount E˜ ∈ (0, E0] of REDD offsets up to which the fair prices of
the forest owner pF (31) and of the electricity producer pE (29) coincide and are equal to
the expected CO2 price p¯. This amount equals the minimum optimal quantity of emissions
generated by the electricity producer at the maximum possible CO2 price p˜ = max{pl}:
pF = pE = p¯ for any E ≤ E˜ , δ ∈ [0, 1], (33)
where
E˜ = E(x∗
1
(p˜)), p¯ =
m∑
l=1
plwl. (34)
For any amount of REDD offsets larger than E˜ (34) the fair price of the forest owner
pF is higher than the fair price of the electricity producer pE:
pF > pE for any E > E˜ , δ ∈ [0, 1). (35)
The proof is given in the A.1.
Remark 5. Theorem 1 shows that in the case of a bounded CO2 price distribution, the
forest owner and electricity producer can contract any amount E ∈ (0, E˜ ] of REDD offsets
for the fair price p¯. Thus, in the considered risk-neutral case, only two characteristics of
distribution fully determine the solution to the problem: the mean and the highest price.
The practical consequence following from this result is that – on one hand – the
potentially contracted amount is limited by the potentially high future CO2 price (the
higher the price, the lower is the contracted amount). On the other hand, even in the
risk-neutral case with possibility of a high CO2 price the contracted amount is non-zero,
hinting at the opportunity to practically implement the REDD-based offset instrument
featuring a benefit sharing approach as considered in this paper.
3 Modeling Results
The analytical solution obtained for the case of risk-neutral utilities (27) in the previous
section is valid for a broad range of possible model setups in our modeling framework. In
order to provide a numerical example and illustrate the impacts of risk preferences and
benefit sharing mechanism on the contracted amount of REDD offsets, we calibrate the
model for a realistic case-study, and carry out numeric optimization.
3.1 Data and calibration
Technologies in the model In our illustrative case study a regional electricity producer
is operating power plants with the following technologies: coal (pulverized coal steam),
combustion turbine (natural gas-fired) and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) (see [7]).
The corresponding fixed and variable costs, as well as the installed capacities are given in
Table 1. The total size of installed capacity (7900 MW) is chosen to illustrate a model at
a regional scale, and is roughly equivalent to the installed capacity of Belarus2.
2See International Energy Statistics provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
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Table 1: Technological data for the case-study. Sources: [7, 15, 16].
Technology Annual fixed
cost, thou-
sands of
US$/MWy
Variable cost,
US$/MWh
Installed Ca-
pacity, MW
Emission fac-
tors, tons of
CO2/MWh
Coal-fired 224 18.9 3800 1.02
Natural gas-fired
combustion turbine
64 55.6 1900 0.55
Natural gas-fired
combined cycle
96 39 2200 0.33
Average hourly electricity demand To construct an economically efficient produc-
tion plan the electricity producer has to determine the combination of technologies to be
used hourly during the day in order to satisfy the hourly demand profile. A hypothetical
demand profile for an average day of the year is depicted in Figure 2. It features the
same shape (peaks) as the regional profiles provided in the literature [17, 18]. The hourly
demand values are scaled to match the installed capacity of the electricity producer (as
in Table 1). Similar to [18] we use the hourly average demand for each day over a longer
period, e.g. one year. We estimate the hourly profile change assuming that a change in
aggregate demand leads to proportional shifts for every hour of the profile on an average
day. Our model works with an average demand profile at the annual scale and provides a
higher level of abstraction than the unit commitment (UC) problem (see e.g. [19]).
Demand function We assume that the electricity producer has market power in the re-
gion, and use a constant elasticity demand curve, that is commonly employed in aggregate
energy demand studies [20, 10]. The consumers respond to the change in electricity price
P e by changing the consumption Q according to an aggregate demand function D(P e),
i.e.:
P e = D−1(Q) = AQα, (36)
where A > 0 is a constant, and α < 0 is the constant elasticity of demand. The
coefficients of the aggregate demand function in our model are calibrated in such a way that
a realistic electricity price (close to European3 electricity price) is achieved in the solution
to an optimization Problem 1. The estimated parameters of the demand function (36) are
A = 1.05 × 105, α = −0.612. These values are consistent with P e = 88.8US$/MWh at
maximum profit without CO2 price. The value of elasticity coefficient ǫd =
1
α
= −1.63 is
within a plausible range as estimated in the literature (for a set of OECD countries it was
found to be within the confidence interval of −2.3, ...,−0.1, see, e.g. [20]). In our example
the profit maximizing quantity is Q0 = 103.65GWh/day (which is approximately equal
to the average daily electricity consumption in Belarus4), and the corresponding profit is
Πˆ(Q0) = 1.3 bln. US$/year (excluding taxes and depreciation).
Emissions factors For presently operating, coal-fired power plants the cumulative emis-
sions range between 950 and 1250 gCO2 eq/ kWh [15]. In our study we use a value from
3See Quarterly Reports On European Electricity Markets http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/market-analysis
4See the EIA website: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
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Figure 2: Average hourly electricity demand (based on Figure 1 in [17]).
this interval as given in Table 1. Emissions factors for gas powered plants are taken from
[16].
3.2 Numerical results
Simulations were carried out for the discrete (nine points) approximation of a uniform
price distribution within the range 0–80 US$/ton of CO2:
pl = 10(l − 1), wl =
1
9
, l = 1, .., 9. (37)
Sizes of REDD-based offset contracts used in the model are within the range [0, E0],
where E0 is the optimal emission without CO2 price.
3.2.1 A case of risk-neutral utilities
Let us start with a case of risk-neutral utilities (27) (by setting parameters close to zero:
α = 0.001 in (17), and β = 0.001 in (25)). In Figure 3 the fair prices (29) and (31) with
respect to the contracted amount of offsets E ≤ E0 are depicted for the benefit sharing
ratio δ = 0.5. The plot demonstrates that the maximum amount of emissions offsets for
which the deal can take place is E˜ = E(x∗(p9)) = 11.8 MtCO2/day, i.e. 4 GtCO2/year
(at the equilibrium fair price p¯ = 40 US$/tonCO2). That amount the electricity producer
emits at the maximum CO2 price p9 = 80 US$/ton CO2, while maximizing his profit. For
amounts larger than E˜ the fair price of the forest owner is higher than the fair price of
the electricity producer. This is consistent with the analytical results (33), (35).
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Figure 3: Fair prices of the risk-neutral electricity producer (EP) and forest owner (FO)
depending on the volume of REDD offsets. Benefit sharing ratio is δ = 0.5, and future
CO2 price distribution is uniform within the range 0–80 US$/ton CO2.
In the following sections we keep all model parameters fixed except for the risk pref-
erences of the forest owner and electricity producer, by assigning values to parameters α
and β, and benefit sharing ratio δ.
3.2.2 Sensitivity analysis of fair prices with respect to risk preferences
In Figure 4 we show, how different values of parameter α (risk preferences of the electricity
producer) impact the fair prices of the electricity producer pE = pE(E) (29) for the fixed
benefit sharing ratio δ = 0.5. The range of parameter α ∈ [−0.2, 0.2] corresponds to
approximately 10 % variation of the fair price relative to the risk-neutral scenario, α ≃ 0
(see Figure 1 with utilities). The plot demonstrates, that the risk-taking (α < 0) electricity
producer is less interested in REDD offsets and, hence, he evaluates these offsets lower
than the risk-neutral (α ≃ 0) electricity producer. Quite the opposite, the risk-averse
electricity producer (α > 0) is ready to pay a higher price for the same amount of REDD
offsets.
The sensitivity of a forest owner’s fair prices is symmetric to the electricity producer’s.
The risk-averse forest owner is charging a lower fair price, and the risk-taking – a higher
fair price – compared to the risk-neutral behavior. Similarly to the electricity producer
the magnitude of change in the forest owner’s fair price depends on the degree of risk
preference parameter β.
3.2.3 Impacts of risk preferences on contracted amounts of REDD offsets
Here we consider the risk-averse electricity producer and risk-averse forest owner by set-
ting their risk preference parameters to positive values: α = β = 0.1, and also the risk-
taking forest owner and risk-taking electricity producer by setting: α = β = −0.1.
For convenience let us denote the maximum contracted amounts by the symbol: EY Z ,
where Y is a risk preference behavior of the electricity producer taking two values: “a”
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of electricity producer’s fair prices with respect to his risk
preferences α < 0 – risk-taking, α ≃ 0 – risk-neutral, α > 0 – risk-averse. Benefit sharing
ratio is δ = 0.5.
– risk-averse, and “t” – risk-taking, and Z is defined in the same manner for the forest
owner.
Figure 5 shows that within the considered set of risk preference parameters the risk
aversion of the electricity producer enables contracting the REDD offsets (if EP is risk-
taking the fair price curves of EP and FO do not intersect and, hence, there is no agree-
ment on the price and consequently REDD offsets cannot be contracted). The contracted
amount when the forest owner is risk-averse exceeds the amount when the forest owner is
risk-taking :
Eaa = 19.5 MtCO2 > Eat = 15.9 MtCO2. (38)
Both contracted amounts Eaa and Eat are greater than in the risk-neutral case (Fig-
ure 3). At the same time the risk-taking electricity producer in this experiment never
agrees on buying any REDD offsets, Eta = Ett = 0, as his buying price is too low – even
lower than than the price set by the risk-averse forest owner (Figure 5). In this case and
generally if there is a gap between supply and demand prices, public funds could help close
the gap and enable emissions offsetting with REDD.
Modeling results presented in this section highlight, that the risk-averse behavior of
the forest owner and electricity producer lead to an increase of contracted amounts of
REDD offsets along with a decrease in price (compare Figures 3 and 5). Obviously, the
contracted amount of REDD offsets also depends on the benefit sharing ratio δ (δ = 0.5
here).
3.2.4 The role of the benefit sharing mechanism
We consider a situation of the risk-averse electricity producer and forest owner where
parameters are set values: α = 0.2, β = 0.8. The plot in Figure 6 shows how the
benefit sharing ratio impacts the contracted amounts of REDD offsets. At every value of
parameter δ expected utilities of the forest owner and electricity producer stay the same,
but the contracted amounts (solid line) and equilibrium prices (dashed line) differ. The
– 15 –
EP(r.−a.)
FO(r.−t.)
FO(r.−a.)
EP(r.−t.)
1 11 22 32 42 53 63 74 84
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
Fa
ir 
pr
ice
s, 
US
$/t
on
 CO
 
 
 
2
Volume of REDD osets, MtCO2
Figure 5: Fair prices of electricity producer (EP) and forest owner (FO) depending on
the volume of REDD offsets. Risk-averse (r.-a.) utilities correspond to α = β = 0.1,
risk-taking (r.-t.) to α = β = −0.1. Benefit sharing ratio is δ = 0.5.
nonlinear shape of the plots is explained by nonregularities in searching for the intersection
point between the curves of fair prices (as in Figure 5). Our modeling results indicate
that there is a certain value of benefit sharing ratio, δ = 0.75 in our case, which provides
the highest possibilities for contracting REDD offsets. Namely, as indicated in Figure 6,
at this “optimal” benefit sharing ratio the entire amount of REDD offsets 83.9MtCO2 can
be contracted at the lowest price 32.9 US$/ton. In this way, benefit sharing allows to
engage in REDD with less investments at the start. The fact that the highest amount
can be traded at lowest price generates possibilities for involving more energy producers
in REDD.
3.2.5 Multiple ranges of contracted REDD offsets
In conclusion, we would like to illustrate an interesting effect arising from certain com-
binations of risk preferences and benefit sharing ratio. In Figure 7 one can see the fair
prices pE = pE(E) (29) and pF = pF (E) (31) constructed for the case when both the
electricity producer and forest owner are risk-averse: α = β = 0.15, and benefit sharing
ratio δ = 0.5. In the plot we observe two points of intersection, meaning that either
smaller amounts of REDD offsets are contracted E ≤ Eaa for the higher price, or a larger
amounts E ≥ Eˆaa – at lower prices. At the same time there is a range of amounts of REDD
offsets E ∈ [Eaa, Eˆaa], which are not contracted as indicated in Figure 7. In our numerical
simulation we observed that this gap vanishes as the benefit sharing ratio increases.
4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
According to a recent IEA report [21] a considerable share of total CO2 emissions (about
80 %) comes from the energy sector. This makes the sector a good candidate for emis-
sions reduction and in particular using REDD. In order to implement REDD mechanism
efficiently it is necessary to understand the decision-making process (rational behavior)
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of fair prices and contacted amounts of REDD offsets with
respect to benefit sharing ratio. Forest owner and electricity producer are risk-averse:
α = 0.2, β = 0.08. Solid line – maximum contracted amounts for each δ ∈ [0, 1], dashed
line – corresponding equilibrium fair prices.
of energy producers – the potential buyers of REDD-based offsets. Our model deals with
the medium-term planning of the electricity producer who possesses flexibility in his re-
sponse to uncertain CO2 prices. The electricity producer in the model is restricted in
exercising market power (raising the electricity price) by the elasticity of demand coming
from electricity consumers and is maximizing his utility (function of profit) by optimizing
technological mixes in the production. Utility of the forest owner (REDD supplier) is a
function of his profits from selling REDD offsets and reflects his risk preferences. In our
study we applied an exponential utility function that includes the risk-neutral utility as
a special case. The analytical results provided in the paper for the risk-neutral utilities
show that there is a restricted amount of REDD offsets that can be contracted in this case.
Modeling results on the fair pricing under risk preferences and active benefit sharing mech-
anism show that risk-averse behavior increases the contracted amounts compared to the
risk-neutral case. In the case where both parties are risk-taking no contracts can be made
(for any possible amount of REDD offsets) under symmetric information on CO2 price
distribution. We illustrated an important feature of benefit sharing mechanism, which
consists in the possibility of choosing optimal benefit sharing ratio, allowing to contract
the highest amount of REDD offsets at the lowest price.
Thus, in this study we identified two promising approaches to effective REDD imple-
mentation in connection to the energy sector: (i) increasing risk-aversion of the energy
producers, or strengthening the policy signal to allow for exposing a risk-averse behavior,
and (ii) activating the benefit sharing mechanism. The current delay in REDD implemen-
tation can be connected with the fact that energy producers are not able to adequately
assess the risks associated with CO2 prices (explained by the weak policy design). An
additional hurdle for REDD development is its future acceptance on carbon markets as
illustrated by the case of the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The benefit
sharing mechanism as discussed in our study, could allow the REDD-supplier and con-
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Figure 7: Fair prices of the risk-averse electricity producer (EP), α = 0.15, and risk-averse
forest owner (FO), β = 0.15, for benefit sharing ratio δ = 0.5.
sumer to have an alternative means of controlling future uncertainty, and hence facilitate
REDD implementation at a larger scale. Another mechanism for supporting REDD (al-
though not cost-free) might involve public funds for closing the price gap between REDD
demand and supply, especially when other means are not sufficient and the uncertainty as
perceived by the parties still remains too high. This is potentially the case where relatively
small investments may play a decisive role in enabling REDD.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. In the case of risk-neutral utilities, the fair prices (29), (31) are calculated as follows:
pF = pF (E , δ) = p¯− (1− δ)
∑m
l=1 plE
R(pl)wl
E
, (39)
pE = pE(E , δ) =
EΠˆR(E , δ)− EΠˆ
E
. (40)
According to Assumption 1 the amount E˜ (34) is emitted by the electricity producer at any
price pl in the distribution (11). Hence, for every p = pl in the distribution the maximum
profit with REDD ΠˆR(pl) differs from the maximum profit without REDD Πˆ(pl) (9) by
the term plE˜ :
ΠˆR(pl) = Πˆ(pl) + plE˜ . (41)
Substituting (41) to the definition of fair price of the electricity producer (40) we get:
pE =
EΠˆR − EΠˆ
E˜
=
EΠˆ + EplE˜ − EΠˆ
E˜
= Epl = p¯. (42)
At the same time, in this case no emissions are returned to the forest owner at any
CO2 price. Substituting E
R
l = 0 to (39) one gets:
pF = p¯. (43)
The same reasoning is valid for any E ∈ (0, E˜ ], and, hence, (33) is true.
Based on Assumption 1 we can show that for the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (E˜ , E0],
there are CO2 price realizations p = pl in the distribution (11) (at least p˜ = max{pl}), for
which the strict inequality takes place pF > pE and, hence, (35) is true.
